Two Whales, One Shrimp, and Two Elections

How elections on polar opposite sides of the planet are linked

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Taiwan, the small, tropical, and rocky island across a narrow strait from southeastern mainland China, has often been called a Shrimp among Whales. Since it was first “discovered” by Portuguese sailors in 1544, Taiwan’s status has never been set in stone. As the Qing Empire was slowly imploding during China’s century of humiliation that began with the start of the Opium Wars in 1839, this remote island seemed an easy target for the many imperialist powers eating away at the once-great Middle Kingdom. Having at one time been occupied by Portuguese, then Dutch traders, every major player at the time, particularly Japan and France, had an interest in Taiwan. Ultimately, following the decisive defeat of the Qing forces at the hands of Imperial Japan in 1895, Taiwan was incorporated into the Japanese Empire, where it would stay for the next 50 years.

Following the complete defeat and breakup of the Japanese empire in 1945 at the hands of the United States, Japan was promptly occupied by the US military, who only relinquished their formal occupation and returned to Japan its sovereignty with the condition that Japan irreversibly demilitarize. With Japan out of the game, Taiwan’s fate rested with only two powers- the United States and the now Communist-run People’s Republic of China. Having crafted during the century of humiliation the myth that the island of Taiwan had always been an integral part of the Chinese realm, the Mao regime in Beijing first expressed its claim on the island, a claim only hardened with the arrival of Mao’s defeated rival in the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-Shek, onto the shores of Taiwan in 1949. Chiang, like Mao on the mainland, would rule the island with an iron fist until his death in 1975. Since 1949, communist governments in mainland China have never accepted this de facto separation and have always vowed that one day, Taiwan would return to the motherland.

Fast forward to the present day. Despite attempts from Taiwan, China, and the USA to formally close the Chinese Civil War and establish a sustainable diplomatic and economic relationship between Communist China and Taiwan (which still legally calls itself the Republic of China), the gulf between the two governments on either side of the strait has only widened.

In 1996, Taiwan held its first ever democratic election. Since 2016, Taiwan has been governed by the once-banned Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)- an organization that strongly opposes mainland influence in Taiwan. Across the strait, Chinese President Xi Jinping has reversed the reform and opening that the People’s Republic of China begun in the 1980s and returned the Middle Kingdom to Mao-style iron-fisted totalitarianism. His hardline rule has raised fears that he may act on Mao’s ambition to reunify the mainland with the autonomous Republic of China by military force, an option deemed too dangerous by his more reform-minded predecessors.

Now, Taiwanese voters are being asked if they want to return President Tsai Ing-Wen’s DPP for a third consecutive term. With Tsai term-limited, the DPP has chosen Vice President Lai Ching-Te as its candidate to replace her. Considered a mild-mannered, soft-spoken man, Lai has hinted in the past that he would drop the name Republic of China and formally declare Taiwan an independent nation. Beijing has already warned in no uncertain terms that such a declaration would cross a red line and provoke a war. Thus, during the campaign, Lai has softened his rhetoric to copy Tsai’s- that the Republic of China, not any hypothetical Republic of Taiwan, is already an independent country, thus making any formal declaration redundant. Still, in the eyes of Xi Jinping and his cronies in Beijing, as well as to Washington, Lai’s earlier statements provoked great concern and would certainly guarantee four more years of high tension on the Taiwan Strait.

Opposing Lai are three men who believe that the DPP has been far too confrontational with the mainland, and it is instead time to end this state of tension, which has seen Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels regularly violating Taiwan’s airspace and territorial waters. Those men are Hou Yu-Ih of Chiang’s Nationalist Party, KMT, former anti-establishment Taipei (Taiwan’s capital) mayor Ko Wen-Je, and billionaire businessman Terry Gou. In opinion polls, the combined support of the three opposition candidates is greater than that of Lai- thus it would make a great deal of sense for one or two of the candidates to withdraw and support another. Problem is, none of them are in any rush to do so. Gou’s campaign is mainly a vehicle for his grudge against the KMT- who rejected him in favor of Hou. Ko has accused the KMT of yanking him into a “forced marriage” as he fears his anti-establishment message would be tainted by an arrangement with the ultimate establishment political party. Thus, as Taiwan’s opposition continue to operate with daggers drawn, Lai appears to be the favorite.

Despite the likelihood of a Lai presidency, the Taiwanese opposition has agreed to make an alliance for the concurrent elections to the Taiwanese assembly, increasing the likelihood of American-style divided government. So what exactly would such an outcome mean for Taiwan’s international status? First, all factions of the Taiwanese political spectrum support a strong, albeit unofficial, relationship with the United States and its allies in Asia, as well as maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland. Thus, there is little chance of Taiwan voluntarily integrating itself closely with the mainland, as this would be deeply unpopular for Taiwan’s population. Also, with a divided government, Beijing will try to work with officials from the Taiwanese assembly opposed to a future president Lai, in their hope that Lai will be isolated and a lame duck. Still, China will keep up its provocative behavior no matter what happens in the election. The only question is the extent of it.

Now, across the Pacific, a similar dynamic is seen in our election. While American politicians bitterly disagree on domestic problems, there is widespread agreement on both sides that China’s behavior under Xi’s militant rule is alarming and a threat to Asian and even domestic American security. So long as Xi refrains from the fateful decision of a military operation against Taiwan, the United States, no matter who runs it, will continue its policy of so-called “de-risking” while at the same time striving to keep the lines of communication open lest the situation escalate into an all-out confrontation. A potential second Trump presidency remains a wild card, given his unorthodox diplomatic overtures to adversarial regimes during his presidency. Since a second Trump presidency would likely be staffed by individuals loyal to him, rather than establishment creatures, Trump may negotiate an entirely different relationship with not only Taiwan, but China as well.

Hypothetically, should the United States scale back its commitment to Taiwan’s de facto independence, Taiwan would have little choice but to submit to the Chinese Communist Party, as no other country has the means to make such a commitment to an unrecognized nation whose population is only about 2% of the People’s Republic of China. Trump himself has been coy about how he will handle Taiwan policy, making any sort of speculation about what he would do a waste of time. However, regardless of who wins in Taipei and Washington, it remains very likely that tensions between the United States and China, the two whales of East Asia, over their mutual desire to control the region’s many shrimps (with Taiwan as the most vulnerable), will remain for the foreseeable future. The challenge for American governments, no matter who is elected, is to maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty as much as possible without pushing Xi Jinping into a corner where he becomes desperate enough to make the same mistake Vladimir Putin made with Ukraine.